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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 10-2058
_____________
DEBORAH MIECZKOWSKI,
Appellant
v.
YORK CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT;
DELORIS PENN; TRESA DIGGS
_____________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1:07-cv-01102)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
_____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 14, 2011
Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 18, 2011)
____________
OPINION
_____________

VANASKIE, Circuit Judge
In this reverse race discrimination and First Amendment retaliation case arising in
the public employment context, Plaintiff Deborah Mieczkowski appeals the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of York City School District (“School
District”), Tresa Diggs, and Deloris Penn. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
We write only for the parties and assume their familiarity with the factual and
procedural history of this case. Mieczkowski was employed by the School District from
February 2004 until June 22, 2007. In July 2006, she became assistant superintendent of
the School District. Mieczkowski, a Caucasian, brought this action against the School
District, Tresa Diggs (the School District’s superintendent), and Deloris Penn (the School
District’s director of human resources), asserting race discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and 42
U.S.C. § 1981, equal protection and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983, and civil
conspiracy under Pennsylvania law. 1
Mieczkowski made a number of allegations in support of her claim of race
discrimination that she maintains on appeal, including that: (1) in December 2005,
Mieczkowski attempted to discipline an African American principal, but Diggs, who is
African American, warned Mieczkowski not to impose discipline upon the principal
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Although Mieczkowski argues that in addition to discrimination, she had also
asserted a hostile work environment claim, the District Court properly found that she
failed to present such a claim in the Complaint.
2

because the school board president, who is also African American, “would not like it”
(Compl. ¶ 23); (2) on October 11, 2006, at a meeting of the School District’s board of
directors, an African American board member made a comment to Penn, who is also
African American, to the effect that Penn was disproportionately disciplining African
American employees, and stated that “it’s about time you went after some whites” (id. ¶¶
25-26); (3) Mieczkowski was excluded from two executive sessions of the school board;
(4) Mieczkowski was arbitrarily asked to cancel vacation days; (5) Mieczkowski was
verbally reprimanded for arriving late to a meeting while other African American
personnel who were consistently late for meetings were never reprimanded; and (6) as
assistant superintendent, Mieczkowski was paid less than Diggs when Diggs was
assistant superintendent, and was also paid less than subordinate African American
employees.
In addition to the above allegations, Mieczkowski relies on the events immediately
preceding her departure from the School District. On November 29, 2006, Diggs
requested a meeting with Mieczkowski, which was attended by Penn. At the meeting,
Diggs attempted to give Mieczkowski a letter addressing Mieczkowski’s failure to ensure
the timely submission of the Alternative Education Report and the Educational
Assistance Program (“EAP”) Report to the Pennsylvania Department of Education.
Diggs wrote that the “letter [was] to remind [Mieczkowski] of the importance of
following through with the requirements of submitting necessary reports for [her] area of
responsibility.” (A. 167o.) Diggs informed Mieczkowski that the Department of
Education had informed the School District that if the EAP Report was not completed by
3

November 22, 2006, the School District would not receive $800,000 in funding, and if
the Alternative Education Report was not submitted, the School District would not
receive $2 million. Diggs stated that Mieczkowski’s “failure to submit these reports in a
timely manner jeopardized $2.8 million in future district funds,” and that it was her
“expectation that this situation will never occur again.” (Id.) Mieczkowski refused to
accept Diggs’s letter, informed Diggs that she could give the letter to Mieczkowski’s
secretary, stated that she wanted legal representation, and then left the room.
Mieczkowski testified that neither Diggs nor Penn objected to her request to have counsel
present.
On or about December 1, 2006, Diggs sent Mieczkowski a letter requesting
another meeting. Although that second letter is not in the record, Mieczkowski testified
that in the letter Diggs accused her of insubordination for refusing the first letter and
requesting legal representation. Diggs testified that her accusation of insubordination
only related to Mieczkowski’s refusal to accept the letter and the allegedly disrespectful
manner in which Mieczkowski refused the letter by shoving the letter back at Diggs.
In December, there was a second meeting, attended by Mieczkowski,
Mieczkowski’s attorney, Diggs, Penn, and the School District’s attorney. At the meeting,
the parties discussed the contents of Diggs’s November 29 letter to Mieczkowski.
Although both letters from Diggs were placed in Mieczkowski’s personnel file, the
record does not indicate that the School District took any formal action against
Mieczkowski, nor that the School District ever considered either terminating or
disciplining her.
4

Mieczkowski claims that as a result of these events, she suffered emotional
distress, anxiety, insomnia and elevated blood pressure, and did not return to work after
December 1, 2006. On June 22, 2007, after exhausting accumulated leave time,
Mieczkowski took a disability retirement.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and
1367(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, and
apply the same standard as the District Court in determining whether summary judgment
was appropriate. Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010).
Under that standard, summary judgment is warranted only “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In making this determination, we must view
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in
that party’s favor.” Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., South Orange-Maplewood Sch. Dist., 587
F.3d 597, 603 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff may prove
discrimination under the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under that framework, a plaintiff bears
the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. In McDonnell
Douglas, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of race
5

discrimination by showing “(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant’s qualifications.” Id. at 802. The Court noted that “[t]he facts necessarily
will vary in Title VII cases,” and that its “specification . . . of the prima facie proof
required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual
situations.” Id. at 802 n.13. The test may also be articulated in more generally applicable
terms:
[T]he plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that: (1) s/he is a member of a
protected class; (2) s/he was qualified for the position s/he
sought to attain or retain; (3) s/he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) the action occurred under
circumstances that could give rise to an inference of
intentional discrimination.
Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008).
In Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999), we recognized that because
the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test “requires plaintiff to establish his or her
identity as a member of a minority group, the literal application of the test would
preclude its use by White plaintiffs alleging ‘reverse discrimination.’” Id. at 158.
Consequently, we held that “all that should be required to establish a prima facie case in
the context of ‘reverse discrimination’ is for the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to
allow a fact finder to conclude that the employer is treating some people less favorably
than others based upon a trait that is protected under Title VII.” Id. at 161.
6

If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts
to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action. Id. at 157. If the employer offers evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action, to defeat summary judgment “the plaintiff
must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a fact finder could
reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2)
believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or
determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Id. at 166 (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32
F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Even under the modified prima facie standard in reverse discrimination cases, a
plaintiff must establish that she suffered an adverse employment action. Stanziale v.
Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2000). We have defined an “adverse employment
action” as an action by an employer that is “‘serious and tangible enough to alter an
employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’” Cardenas
v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120
F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997)).
After carefully analyzing every alleged discriminatory incident and circumstance,
the District Court concluded that Mieczkowski had failed to establish that she had
suffered any adverse employment action, and that even assuming any of the incidents
amounted to an actionable adverse employment action, she had failed to show that she
was being treated less favorably than others on account of her race. Accordingly, the
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District Court concluded that Mieczkowski had failed to establish a prima facie case of
race discrimination under Title VII and § 1981. 2
Mieczkowski concedes that while employed with the School District she did not
suffer a reduction in pay or benefits, a demotion, the loss of a promotion, or a
termination. She argues, however, that her alleged constructive discharge, the fact that
she was “hired at a disparately diminished rate of pay,” and the two letters of reprimand
constitute discrete adverse employment actions. (Appellant’s Br. at 37.) We find
Mieczkowski’s contentions to be without merit.
Certainly, a constructive discharge, if it occurred, constitutes an adverse
employment action. See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 247 n.32 (3d Cir.
2006). Contrary to Mieczkowski’s assertion, however, the District Court did address her
constructive discharge claim. The District Court specifically found that “the evidence of
record fails to support her allegation that she was constructively discharged by any action
or actions that Defendants took during the time Plaintiff worked in the School District.”
Mieczkowski v. York City Sch. Dist., No. 1:07-cv-1102, 2009 WL 6093594, at *6 (M.D.
Pa. Dec. 21, 2009).
To establish a constructive discharge, Mieczkowski was required to show that
“‘the employer knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in employment so
intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign.’” Aman v. Cort
Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1084 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Goss v. Exxon Office
2

“In the Third Circuit, the elements of employment discrimination under Title VII
are identical to the elements of a section 1981 claim.” Schurr v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc.,
196 F.3d 486, 499 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984)). Notwithstanding the medical reasons
Mieczkowski cites for her departure from the School District, we are unable to conclude
that any of the alleged discriminatory incidents and circumstances, alone or taken
together, would compel a reasonable person in Mieczkowski’s position to resign. In this
regard, Mieczkowski was aware of pay differentials and never formally complained about
that matter prior to December 1, 2006. Moreover, the letters of reprimand, only one of
which is before us, are not such as to cause a reasonable person to conclude that
resignation was required to avoid intolerable working conditions. Nor do the other
matters raised in Mieczkowski’s Complaint, singularly or in combination, rise to the level
of intolerable working conditions. Consequently, the District Court correctly concluded
as a matter of law that Mieczkowski was not subject to a constructive discharge when she
stopped coming to work after December 1, 2006.
Mieczkowski also argues that a discriminatory salary disparity between her and
her African American co-workers establishes an adverse employment action. 3 She
contends that, as assistant superintendent, she was paid less than Diggs when Diggs was
assistant superintendent, and that she was paid less than certain subordinate African
American employees. While an unwarranted salary disparity can constitute an adverse
employment action, see Stanziale, 200 F.3d at 105-06, we agree with the District Court
that Mieczkowski failed to present evidence supporting an inference that any differential
in this case was not warranted.
3

Notably, Mieczkowski states that she is not presenting an equal pay claim, but is
instead pointing to salary differentials as evidence of disparate treatment. (Appellant’s
Br. at 36.)
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Initially, we find it noteworthy that while negotiating her compensation for the
assistant superintendent position, Mieczkowski had reviewed the salary information for
Diggs and other School District employees, and, consequently, when executing her
contract, was entirely cognizant of the pay disparities she now alleges were
discriminatory. More significantly, however, Mieczkowski failed to present any
evidence – beyond the mere fact that she earned less than her African American
predecessor and certain subordinate African American employees – from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find that the salary disparities were the result of race
discrimination. Indeed, as the District Court found, “the evidence shows that the School
District’s salaries and pay increases were tied to numerous factors such [as] seniority,
professional certifications, and changes in salary structure dictated by budgetary
concerns.” Mieczkowski, 2009 WL 6093594, at *9. Thus, even assuming Mieczkowski
established a prima facie case of race discrimination on the basis of the cited salary
disparities, she has failed to present any evidence to rebut the wholly legitimate and nondiscriminatory factors that may justify her earning less than either her predecessor or
subordinates. In other words, Mieczkowski failed to show that she was similarly situated
to her alleged comparators. See Stanziale, 200 F.3d at 107. Accordingly, we find that the
District Court properly determined that Mieczkowski failed to present evidence showing
that any salary disparity constituted an adverse employment action.
Finally, Mieczkowski argues that the two letters of reprimand she received in
November and December 2006 immediately preceding her departure from the School
District were adverse employment actions. In Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420 (3d
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Cir. 2001), we rejected the district court’s presumption that written reprimands adversely
affected the terms and conditions of employment, holding that the burden is on the
plaintiff “to establish how these two [written] reprimands effect[ed] a material change in
the terms or conditions of his employment.” Id. at 431. In other words, reprimands that
do not “effect a material change in the terms or conditions of . . . employment” cannot be
considered adverse employment actions. Id. In determining in Weston that the two
written reprimands did not qualify as adverse employment actions, we observed that the
plaintiff “was not demoted in title, did not have his work schedule changed, was not
reassigned to a different position or location in the [workplace], did not have his hours or
work changed or altered in any way, and that he was not denied any pay raise or
promotion as a result of these reprimands.” Id. We further noted the fact that the
reprimands were placed in the plaintiff’s personnel file for a period of six months, and
were thus “of a temporary nature,” and “were not permanently affixed to [the plaintiff’s]
file.” Id.
To distinguish Weston, Mieczkowski relies on the fact that in her case the letters
of reprimand were permanently placed in her personnel file. We do not think this
distinction is sufficient to establish that her letters of reprimand were adverse
employment actions. Weston rejected a presumption that written letters of reprimand
caused a material change in the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s employment. Id.
Weston makes clear that in order to constitute an adverse employment action, the letters
had to have effected a material change in the terms or conditions of Mieczkowski’s
employment. Beyond alleging that the letters of reprimand were unjustly issued and
11

placed in her permanent personnel file, Mieczkowski has not demonstrated how the
letters materially changed her employment status. In the absence of such evidence, and
in light of the fact that the letters neither warned of future disciplinary action nor
termination, we find that Mieczkowski failed to demonstrate that the letters constituted
adverse employment actions. 4
Moreover, we agree with the District Court that even if the two letters of
reprimand constituted adverse employment actions, Mieczkowski has not presented
evidence to show that the letters were the result of discriminatory animus. In support of
her claim that the November 29 letter of reprimand raises an inference of discrimination,
Mieczkowski argues that the reprimand was unjust. Mieczkowski specifically argues that
she was not at fault for the late submission of the reports because a portion of one of the
late reports had to be completed by an outside contractor, and the contractor had failed to
complete its portion of the report on time. She also points to a November 30, 2006 email
from the Department of Education to Mieczkowski which states that although the funding
connected to the Alternative Education Report had been “held” pending the report’s
submission, “[a]t no time was York City School District in jeopardy of losing the funds.”
(A. 290.) Mieczkowski therefore argues that a reasonable jury could find that Diggs
“knew that [Mieczkowski] was not responsible for the delay” and conclude that any
discipline was “contrived” and discriminatory. (Appellant’s Br. at 31-32.)

4

It is noteworthy that Mieczkowski never returned to work after the second
reprimand was issued and eventually took a disability retirement. Thus, the inclusion of
the letters in her personnel file could not have adversely affected her advancement, pay
increases, or other employment prospects.
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Mieczkowski seems to miss the point in her repeated insistence that she was not at
fault – the record establishes that as assistant superintendent it was her responsibility to
submit the reports, regardless of any circumstances affecting her ability to discharge that
responsibility. Moreover, the November 30 email from the Department of Education
does not establish that on November 29 Diggs was aware that the School District’s
funding was not in jeopardy. Indeed, Diggs received an email on November 19 from the
Department of Education informing her that the department was “still holding the 06/07
Alt Ed Demo Grant ($2M) until York City has submitted the 2005/2006 Alt Ed End of
Year Report” and asking that Diggs “rectify this issue URGENTLY.” (A. 262.)
Consequently, we cannot say that the reprimand following the late submission of the
reports was so “unjust,” or that the concern that the failure to timely submit the reports
jeopardized funding was so unfounded, that the reprimand raises an inference of
discrimination.
Mieczkowski emphasizes that at a school board meeting approximately two
months prior to the first letter of reprimand, an African American member of the School
District’s board of directors made a comment to Penn to the effect that Penn, as director
of human resources, was disproportionately disciplining African Americans and told her
that “it’s about time you went after some whites.” (Compl. ¶ 26.) Mieczkowski asserts
that “[t]hereafter, Penn pursued Plaintiff . . . as a way to satisfy the District’s desire to go
after whites.” (Appellant’s Br. at 8.)
“We have generally held that comments by those individuals outside of the
decisionmaking chain are stray remarks, which, standing alone, are inadequate to support
13

an inference of discrimination.” Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 521 (3d
Cir. 1997). There is nothing in the record to suggest that either the board member who
told Penn to go “after whites” or Penn had any involvement in the decision to reprimand
Mieczkowski, or that Diggs was motivated by the board member’s comment in her
decision to reprimand Mieczkowski. Accordingly, we find that the District Court
correctly concluded that even if the letters of reprimand constituted adverse employment
actions, Mieczkowski failed to show that Diggs treated Mieczkowski less favorably than
other employees based on her race.
In sum, we find that the District Court correctly concluded that Mieczkowski
failed to show that she suffered an adverse employment action. We also agree that even
if Mieczkowski successfully alleged an adverse employment action, none of the alleged
incidents or circumstances raise any inference of discrimination. We will therefore
affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the Title VII and § 1981
discrimination claims. Furthermore, because the lack of evidence to support her
discrimination claims is also fatal to her § 1983 equal protection claim, we will also
affirm the grant of summary judgment on that claim. See Chambers ex rel. Chambers v.
Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 196 (3d Cir. 2009) (“To bring a
successful claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a denial of equal protection, plaintiffs must
prove the existence of purposeful discrimination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
IV.
“To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee plaintiff must
allege that his activity is protected by the First Amendment, and that the protected
14

activity was a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action.” Gorum v. Sessoms, 561
F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir.2009). “[T]he key question in determining whether a cognizable
First Amendment claim has been stated is whether ‘the alleged retaliatory conduct was
sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment
rights.’” McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna,
203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Mieczkowski contends that she was accused of insubordination as a result of her
request for counsel. 5 Even assuming, as the District Court did, that Mieczkowski’s
request for counsel was constitutionally protected speech, we are unable to conclude that
Mieczkowski presented sufficient evidence of a retaliatory action that would be sufficient
to constitute actionable conduct.

5

Mieczkowski’s Complaint alleged that “[o]n or around December 1, 2006,
Defendant Diggs issued a second written discipline letter from the defendant York
County School District alleging insubordination because the Plaintiff requested to secure
legal advice in dealing with the first discipline letter. This misconduct violated plaintiff’s
1st Amendment rights.” (Compl. ¶ 32.) In her brief in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, she also characterized the protected activity as “speech, i.e.,
requesting time to consult a lawyer.” (Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at
17.) In her appellate brief, Mieczkowski submits that “the issue of requesting a lawyer
does not capture the full nature of plaintiff’s protected activities.” (Appellant’s Br. at
42.) She argues that “[w]hile [she] did not file a formal complaint of discrimination,
there is evidence that she questioned and complained to Diggs, Penn, and others about the
treatment to which she was being subjected, and such complaints or reports of
mistreatment are inherently matters of public concern, which are protected by the First
Amendment.” (Id. at 44.) Because she never argued in the District Court that she was
retaliated against for such activities, the argument is waived. See United States v.
Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 212 (3d Cir. 2005). In any event, because Mieczkowski failed to
satisfy the adverse action and causation elements of a retaliation claim, the question of
what constitutes First Amendment-protected conduct is academic.
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The second letter of reprimand that Mieczkowski claims constitutes actionable
retaliatory conduct is not in the record, and we are therefore unable to review whether its
language could support Mieczkowski’s claim. As we found above, our holding in
Weston makes clear that the written reprimand did not constitute an adverse employment
action. 251 F.3d at 431. Although a letter that does not rise to the level of an adverse
employment action may nonetheless support a prima facie case of First Amendment
retaliation, see Suppan, 203 F.3d at 234, it will only do so if it is sufficient to deter a
person of ordinary firmness from exercising free speech rights, McKee, 436 F.3d at 170.
Mieczkowski has not shown that the second letter she received would have any such
effect.
Mieczkowski’s own representations indicate that the letter was prompted by her
refusal to accept the November 29 letter of reprimand. Mieczkowski does not dispute the
fact that she refused to take the November 29 letter. Receipt of a follow-up letter
accusing an employee of insubordination under these circumstances would not deter a
reasonable person from requesting counsel.
Furthermore, beyond Mieczkowski’s own allegation, there is nothing in the record
suggesting a causal connection between the request for counsel and the written
reprimand. As Mieczkowski testified, Diggs and Penn never objected to the request, and
a second meeting was eventually held at which both parties were represented by counsel.
Consequently, we find that the District Court correctly determined that Mieczkowski
failed to present sufficient evidence that her request for counsel was a substantial factor
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in Diggs’s subsequent charge of insubordination, and we will therefore affirm the grant of
summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim.
V.
There is no liability for civil conspiracy where there is no liability for the act or
acts underlying the conspiracy. See Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215
F.3d 396, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). Because we find that the District Court properly entered
summary judgment against Mieczkowski on her civil rights claims, we will also affirm
the grant of summary judgment on her civil conspiracy claim under Pennsylvania law.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellees.
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